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Toward a History of Documents
in Medieval India:
The Encounter of Scholasticism and
Regional Law in the Smṛticandrikā
DONALD R. DAVIS, JR.

A perennial challenge

in the study of law in medieval India concerns
the encounter of scholastic legal discourse and local and regional practices of law.
Composed over a period of roughly two thousand years, the notoriously ahistori
cal Sanskrit textual corpus called dharmaśāstra contains systematized discussions
of all major legal topics, codified and elaborated through centuries of scholastic
commentary and compilation.1 Datable, locatable evidence for the practice of law
in similar topical areas and over a similar length of time, however, is either scarce,
nonexistent, or unstudied. Indologists have approached this divide in several ways,
ranging from naï�ve acceptance of the scholastic corpus as evidence of historical
practice to the total rejection of the texts as a fantasy of luxurious Brahmins.
The present article takes up the use of documents as a revealing focus for
approaching the encounter of text and practice in the laws of medieval India
(ca. 600–1500 CE, though no one agrees about these limits). The range of writ
ten material available from medieval India may be roughly classified into three
groups: 1) texts, substantial writings by eponymous authors of uncertain dating
that contain treatises or original works of literature, theology, law, science, and
so forth, generally preserved on palm-leaf, or later paper, manuscripts that were
continually recopied; 2) inscriptions, short and medium-length writings by nota
ble political figures and donors that record a specific event, giving the relevant
names, places, and inscribed on durable substances such as stone or copper; and
3) documents, typically short records of particular transactions, agreements, con
tracts, and so on that specify the parties’ names, the materials involved, and other
transactional details, written on less durable materials such as palm leaf, birch
bark, or prepared fabric and rarely recopied.2 Within the last group, many types
I acknowledge with gratitude the valuable feedback and suggestions for improvement given
to me by Elizabeth Lambourn, Patrick Olivelle, and the two anonymous reviewers of the
journal.
1 Lingat, Classical Law of India; Olivelle, Dharmasūtras.

2 These large categories and the subcategories within them are all conveniences that are
belied by regular categorical crossovers. So, the poetic preambles of Sanskrit inscriptions
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of “document” are spoken about and sometimes copied into “texts” in the special
sense above, though we do not have preserved examples of all types outside of the
texts. From the other side, the types of historical documents actually known from
medieval India far exceed the categories described in dharmaśāstra or in other
textual sources.
The focus here will be a fresh translation of the description of documents in
the twelfth-century digest of Hindu law called the Smṛticandrikā, (Moonlight on
the Laws) and its possible historical value.3 Its author, Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa, came
from South India and some of his views (for example, the idea of inheritance by
birth) reflect regional views, but beyond this fact we know only his name and that
of his father. His digest of laws is one of the most comprehensive and thoroughly
explained in the entire corpus of dharmaśāstra. Like all digests of law in Sanskrit,
the Smṛticandrikā collects relevant legal rules from “root-texts”—undated earlier
texts by eponymous authors—arranges them topically, and provides explanations
and clarifications in the form of scholastic commentary. As such, it provides a reli
able and intelligent discussion of every major topic of Hindu law, from daily and
occasioned ritual practice to legal procedure and substantive law to penance and
punishment.
The thoroughness and comprehensive intent of the Smṛticandrikā make it
an ideal starting point for a more detailed examination of the use of documents
within medieval South Asian legal practice because this scholastic text categorizes
myriad types for which historical examples exist. The discussion of documents
that will be presented here is found within a larger section on legal procedure and
state policy (vyavahāra)—more precisely as part of the description of evidence
accepted in courts—and it describes thirteen different document types under
the twin rubrics of “royal” and “popular” documents.4 Therefore, historical legal
practice is recorded in the special idiom of Sanskrit scholasticism, even though
are often on par with the best poetry found in texts. Inscriptions likewise can function like
documents, legal and/or political. Salomon (Indian Epigraphy, 110) discusses such overlap
in the context of his now standard survey of the Indo-Aryan inscriptional corpus.
3 Srinivasacharya, Smṛticandrikā by Devaṇabhaṭṭa.

4 The distinction between “royal” (rājakīya) and “popular” (jānapada, laukika) is basic to
all discussions of documents in Sanskrit. The first is easier to grasp as the set of documents
initiated and executed by the state. The second refers to ordinary documents used for the
transactions of private people. One reviewer suggested “civil” instead of “popular,” but this
carries too many connotations of citizenship and connection to a political body. “Popular”
documents are those relating to or generated by the general public as opposed to the
government. Unfortunately, no single adjective is ideal in translation.
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such practice can only be situated in place and time through other evidence.5
More importantly, however, the way in which different documents are placed into
categories reveals cultural understandings of the distinct functions and purposes
of those documents. Legal documents themselves do not come with a guide on
how to interpret them, but the scholastic texts do, even if one must also read their
taxonomies with a critical eye. The Smṛticandrikā discloses political, social, reli
gious, and economic functions of legal documents, giving us a window into the
cultural significance of documents beyond the legal arrangements described in
the documents themselves. The important conclusion to be drawn here is that the
scholastic tradition of dharmaśāstra helps us to do more than speak of generic
“documentary culture” and rather helps to draw meaningful historical and cul
tural distinctions between the materials and functions of different documentary
types in medieval India. Although they may seem to be straightforward carriers of
information, documents are no more transparent than other types of writing, and
we must, therefore, attend to their contexts and social construction.
The history of law is in part the history of legalism, the processes by which
rules and categories are used to order a conceptual world, typically one invested
with religious or moral value. Paul Dresch writes, “Legalism means the world is
addressed through categories and [explicit] rules that stand apart from practice.”6
What dharmaśāstra texts offer historians is an important Indian articulation of the
salient categories of legal thought and rule formation. As one of the most cogent
and clear categorical presentations of the rules for documents in Sanskrit, the
Smṛticandrikā, therefore, gives us insight into how practical documents may have
been received: that is, how they fit into the conceptual frameworks of the time.
The scholastic nature of the Smṛticandrikā, however, limits how much history we
can read into the text.7 On the one hand, we feel the author’s scholastic compul
sion to be true to the commentarial tradition by not elaborating further categories
of document beyond those mentioned in the accepted root-texts; on the other, the
author is also frustrated by knowing how many more types of document actually
existed “in accordance with local standards.”

The Social History of Documents in Medieval India

In an important way, this is the story of law: the formation of endless practical legal
arrangements, the creation of rules and categories to tame them, and the subse
5 See Lariviere, “Dharmaśāstra, Custom, ‘Real Law,’ and ‘Apocryphal’ Smṛtis.”
6 Dresch, “Legalism, Anthropology, and History,” 15.
7 Rocher, Studies in Hindu Law.
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quent mutual development of (and tension between) both as an ongoing encoun
ter.8 Within that story, I provide first a very cursory overview of documents from
medieval India, relying on existing syntheses of various sources for the history of
written materials in India. I then give a full translation of the chapter defining docu
ments in the Smṛticandrikā, in order to make one influential systematization of
rules and categories available to a wider audience. The idea is to lay out a prelimi
nary scheme for what it would take to write a fuller history of legal documents in
medieval India. What we need in South Asian history is a volume like M. T. Clanchy’s
classic From Memory to Written Record. Essentially, I would like to sketch here how
it might be done and to relate that sketch to the question of legal encounters.
The most comprehensive work to date on forms of documentation in medieval
India is Ingo Strauch’s edition and translation of the Lekhapaddhati,9 a formulary
of written exemplars of nearly one hundred types of document compiled between
the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries. Here, we have letters addressed to figures
ranging from an honored teacher to family members to friends; “public docu
ments” such as royal instructions, decrees, tribunal decisions, charters, seizure
notices, official communications, and ordeal certificates; “private documents,”
including commercial contracts, sale deeds, mortgages, receipts, gift records, and
bills of safe passage; and “additional documents,” covering tax notices, court judg
ments, bills of credit, and diplomatic communiqués. The huge number of docu
ment types modeled in a regional form of Gujarati-Sanskrit immediately tells us
that, by the fifteenth century, documents of considerable variety were known to
formulary compilers and, we can safely assume, in practice. Because they provide
exemplar-like models—with names, amounts, and other details—formularies like
the Lekhapaddhati get us close to practice without containing the records of actual
legal transactions.
In addition to excellent work on the formulary itself, Strauch also provides a
thorough study of the development of dharmaśāstra rules concerning documents
in ancient Indian law.10 He stops, however, with the last major root-text in approx
imately the seventh century, ignoring all of the commentarial literature that fol
lowed down to the eighteenth century. While understandable, given his purposes,
it is precisely in the commentarial syntheses of the root-text material that we find
a more coherent and complete view of the rules and categories for documents in
8 For a description of an exemplary regional case of this encounter in late medieval
Kerala, see Davis, “Recovering the Indigenous Legal Traditions,” 166–67.
9 An English translation, but much less reliable than Strauch’s edition and German
translation, can be found in Prasad, Lekhapaddhati.
10 Die Lekhapaddhati-Lekhapañcāsikā, 19–52.
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medieval India. However, it is Strauch’s impulse to move between documentary
instance and categorical reflection that I want to emphasize.
The other essential starting point for a history of documents in medieval India
is the work of Richard Salomon, and D. C. Sircar before him, on India’s large cor
pus of inscriptions. Salomon is the latest in an illustrious line of epigraphy scholars
whose fundamental work made South Asian historiography possible in the first
place. Pertinent to both documents and epigraphy, Salomon notes that “the history
of ancient and medieval (i.e., pre-Islamic) India must for the most part be recon
structed from incidental sources; that is, sources whose original intent was some
thing other than the recording of historical events as such.”11 The line between doc
ument and epigraph is not always clear. Thus, Salomon’s typological, chronological,
and geographical surveys of the inscriptions in Indo-Aryan languages include con
tracts, donations, and charters, among other genres that might be classed as docu
ments. The principal distinction lies rather in the material form, documents usually
being written on palm leaf, birch bark, and (later) paper. The almost total lack of
self-consciously historical texts in India, which is not the same as a lack of histori
cal sense or orientation, has made epigraphy into “a primary rather than a second
ary subfield within Indology” not a “corroborative and supplementary source” as
in other areas of the world.12 The challenges of Indian epigraphy for historians are
unique: “Not only is the material vast, voluminous, and inherently difficult; it also
requires a command of a range of languages, dialects, and script forms far greater
than that needed for epigraphic studies in most other parts of the world.”13
Together, Salomon, Strauch, and others supply a promising baseline for a richer
history of documentary cultures in medieval India. Through their work, one finds
important earlier studies of epistolary writing,14 of regional and dynastic collec
tions of inscriptions,15 and of temple and royal archives.16 If combined with analy
11 Salomon, Indian Epigraphy, 3.
12 Ibid., 4.

13 Ibid., 5–6.

14 For an overview, see Michaels, “Practice of Classical Hindu Law,” 63–67. Among many
collections and studies of formularies and epistolary writing, see also Thakur, “Documents
in Ancient India”; Sanskrit Documents; Banerji, “Study of the Epistolary and Documentary
Literature”; Vidyāpati Ṭhākura, Likhanāvalī; Salomon, “Ukti-Vyakti-Prakarana.” In a recent
study of the Likhanāvalī, Jha (“Beyond the Local and the Universal,” 35) makes the very
plausible suggestion that collections of models for different types of writing for Indic
languages were triggered in part by the influence of Persian inshā texts.
15 Salomon’s bibliography (Indian Epigraphy, 311–27) is indispensable as a reference for
general, regional, and specific studies of Indian epigraphy.
16 Archival studies focused on law include Gune, Judicial System of the Marathas; Documents
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ses of dharmaśāstra and other textual material, at least two important types of
documentary histories could emerge. First, more regionally focused histories that
describe the typology and chronology of documents in relation to political, legal,
economic, religious, and other social historical themes would bring the documents
out of their incidental historical connection and into an interpretive framework.
The narrower range of languages and scripts involved make such work possible
and would, in turn, create the conditions for a macroscopic overview of document
usage. The goal of this second type of history would be a story about the impact of
documents throughout the medieval period in India, but with the necessary atten
tion to differences of pace and usage that regional histories reveal.
By attending to the specificities of documentary categories, of regional pat
terns, of narrative depictions of document use, and of textual prescriptions for
documents and their authentication, we could move beyond vague invocations of
literacy and documentary culture in the singular.17 Writing itself, of course, pro
duced momentous changes in India as it did everywhere, but its introduction was
neither definitive nor suddenly widespread. In fact, only careful collation of exist
ing enumerations of inscriptions and documents can yield a sense of when the use
of writing per se accelerated, and which specific types of writing emerged when.
The key for any history of documents, in my view, is the desperate need for better
interpretive theoretical frameworks within which one can make sense of writing
from medieval India. Exemplary work, usually based on inscriptions, does exist,18
but so much more is waiting to be studied and, further, to be synthesized beyond
the few regional frameworks that have paved the way for future work.

Legal Encounters of Text and Document

One important source of guidance for a social history of documents will be their
interface with textual traditions like dharmaśāstra. While always suspicious in
their highly systematic and list-oriented presentation, dharmaśāstra texts, espe
cially medieval commentaries and digests, give us a preliminary schema of cat
egories and rules within which to place the dated documents of practice. A study
of the connections and disconnections between texts and documents, therefore,
helps us avoid imposing anachronistic or culturally strange assumptions on the
from the Rudravarṇa-Mahāvihāra; Vanjari Grandhavari; and Davis, Boundaries of Hindu Law.
17 As in Gurukkal, “Shift of Trust from Words to Deeds.”

18 So, for example, Stein, Peasant, State, and Society; Chattopadhyaya, Studying Early India;
Orr, Donors, Devotees, and Daughters; Talbot, Precolonial India in Practice; and Veluthat,
Early Medieval in South India.
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material. This dilemma is nothing new, of course, being a version of a central prob
lem of the modern debate over law in action versus law in books and the conflicts
among positivists, naturalists, and realists, each of whom adopts a distinctive atti
tude toward the value of written law and its encounter with practical legal prob
lems.19 When it comes to the role of documents, the Smṛticandrikā suggests that
their legal functions are better captured in texts while their historical valences are
better seen in practical examples.
Consider, for instance, the opening distinction made between royal and popu
lar documents in the Smṛticandrikā. The legal effect of this distinction is still not
fully understood. For example, to interpret a copper-plate inscription sealed with
wax by a king or a royal inscription on stone as a legal document is to place it in a
culturally and historically incongruous category. The śāsana, decree or edict (most
often a donation), was first of all a political act that had religious and legal side
effects. In the name of magnifying the king’s glory and political power, decrees
generated religious merit for the donor(s), and they conveyed legal privileges,
exemptions, and protections on the beneficiaries. However, a royal decree in medi
eval India was neither a legislative declaration of a general law nor a record of
legal arrangements intended for evidentiary use in courts.20 As the Smṛticandrikā
suggests, the main threat to a royal decree was a later king (see 1a below), whose
violation of the gift would undermine both its religious and legal value. Contraven
tion by a later king, moreover, would allow no legal recourse through the evidence
of the decree. That is to say, there was no way to take the new king to court, if he
19 Lon Fuller’s classic satire, “Case of Speluncean Explorers,” is as good a place as any
to discern the real difficulties of adopting any rigid, inflexible attitude, no matter how
principled, toward the authority of written law.

20 This strong statement relies on a distinction of political and legal actions that I see as
important and basic in the legal categories of Dharmaśāstra. Consider the recently examined
example of the eighth-century Vēḷvikuṭi copper plates: Gillet, “Dark Period,” 294–97. The
inscription portrays a Pāṇḍya king restoring a grant of land that had been seized by the
notorious Kalabhra kings to a group of Brahmins, after they had produced a document
showing the antiquity of the grant (nāṭṭāl niṉ paḻamai (y) ātal kāṭṭi). In my view, the scene
conforms well to the future political threats against land grants by later kings described
in the Smṛticandrikā. The aggrieved Brahmins make an appeal to the current, benevolent
king to restore a lost grant, and the king in turn “magnanimously accepted [their appeal
and document] as a royal act of grace” (cemmānt’ avaṉ eṭutt’ aruḷi). There is no legal case
against anyone, least of all the offending kings. Rather, the plea is for the new king’s grace
and beneficence. If the circumstances were legal in nature, we could imagine the Brahmins
having some other recourse, in case the king did not accept their plea and proof. The fact that
they obviously do not have any such legal option leads me to characterize this and similar
situations as primarily political in nature. Any legality in such cases is fragile at best.
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chose to violate the terms of the old king’s decree. Only political and moral appeals
were possible. In this way, the difference between royal and popular documents is
nontrivial and shapes how we should understand the reception of different docu
ment types in context.
By contrast, the verdict or “victory-document” (jayapatra)21 at the conclusion
of a full-blown trial is also classed as a “royal” document (see 1b below), but it is
intrinsically legal as well. One might expect that the frequent injunction to provide
a written verdict to a successful litigant would have generated many historical
examples of litigated case law for medieval India.22 Unfortunately, I am not aware
of a single example of a jayapatra from India that delineates a full trial prior to the
eighteenth century.23 To find them, we have to travel to Java and to Mason Hoad
ley’s essay on the transplantation of the jayapatra to Java, which remains the best
survey and study of jayapatras, even for India.24 While acknowledging that some
link to India and some practical presence of verdicts there must have existed,
Hoadley shows that the evidence for written verdicts in Java (and Cambodia)
begins in the tenth century, at least three centuries before any Indian attestation.
Even allowing for the inevitable loss of the majority of such verdicts due to the
fragility of writing material and environmental factors, the paucity of examples
for medieval India still suggests that document production by Indian courts was
neither vibrant nor prolific. Nevertheless, the transplanted and modified forms
found outside India do help soften the argument from silence and seem to allow us
to justify the use of extensive dharmaśāstra discussions of verdicts in describing
the practical legal use of writing in the medieval period.
If the adjudication of civil matters was meant to produce a written verdict,
how then were evidentiary documents used in those judicial contexts? Here again,
in addition to cataloging their various types (lekhyanirūpaṇam), dharmaśāstra
21 Sanskrit orthography would normally require patra, “leaf, document,” to be written
pattra. However, the usage of patra with a single “t” is so ubiquitous in both inscriptional
and manuscript evidence of medieval India that it seems artificial to “correct” what was
obviously an accepted spelling in this period. I have retained the spelling patra, exclusively
used in the Smṛticandrikā, throughout.
22 Similarly, one would expect the Dharmaśāstra texts to refer to the ubiquitous Indian
practice of inscription on stone, but they do not.

23 In addition to the jayapatra of 1794 which he translates, Lariviere (“Witness as the
Basis,” 53–57) tries valiantly to adduce reasons why we would not find jayapatras (decay of
manuscript materials and transfer of cases to Mughal courts), but manages to find only two
ordeal-related (and very truncated) examples from seventeenth-century Karnataka and nine
additional examples from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
24 Hoadley, “Continuity and Change.”
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supplies extensive discussions of the verification of documents’ legal validity
(lekhyaparīkṣā),25 including the required elements, restrictions on who may have
documents made, and many faults which nullify their evidentiary value. A desire
for authenticity and avoidance of forgery drives the discussion. Indeed, one senses
a mistrust of documents as legal evidence throughout. That same mistrust shows
up in the premium placed on the testimony of witnesses. In fact, as Richard Lariv
iere has argued, documents of many kinds fail without the support of witnesses,
to the point that the witness becomes the paradigmatic mode of proof in Hindu
law.26 Unlike in Islamic law, however, documents always retained explicit doctri
nal sanction as evidentiary proof in dharmaśāstra.27 The effects of this cultural
suspicion led to the abundant use of witnesses to documents in both theoretical
discussions and practical examples. Royal documents written by the king himself
and sealed with the royal seal, however, were accepted even without witnesses’
signatures.28 Without this interpretive frame about the role of witness made pos
sible by dharmaśāstra, we run the risk of succumbing to the “prejudice in favor of
literacy” which Clanchy warns us against.29 In order to see the interpretive help
offered by dharmaśāstra in greater detail, let us now examine the full discussion of
documents in the Smṛticandrikā.

Translation of the Chapter entitled “Definition of Documents”
in the Smṛticandrikā

My translation below is based primarily on the text edited by Srinivasacharya,30
but occasional textual emendations have been made using a compendium known
as the Dharmakośa. I have benefitted greatly from the earlier, hard-to-find trans
lation of J. R. Gharpure and from suggestions by Patrick Olivelle. In general,
Gharpure’s translation is good, but it leans heavily toward an off-putting hybrid of
Sanskrit and English and consists too often of paraphrase rather than translation.
As a result, a new translation was essential.
25 This section of the Smṛticandrikā follows immediately after the one translated here.
26 Lariviere, “Witness as the Basis.”

27 Compare the well-known proscription of documents as evidence in classical Islamic
law and its practical encounter with Muslim communities. See, for example, Messick, “Just
Writing.” The broad emphasis of the two traditions seems reversed while the practice
appears closer.
28 Lariviere, “Witness as the Basis,” 67; see also 1a, 1c–e, below.
29 Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record, 7.

30 Srinivasacharya, Smṛticandrikā by Devaṇabhaṭṭa, 3:125–39.
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The chapter opens with a preamble on the two categories of documents and
is subdivided thereafter into two sections, royal (section 1 in this translation) and
popular documents (section 2). Under royal documents are discussed decrees
(1a), verdicts (1b), orders (1c), instruction documents (1d), and “documents of
gratitude” (1e). The section on popular documents, by contrast, departs from this
typological classification to discuss “types of popular document” (2a), followed by
a concluding discussion of “the utility of popular documents” (2b). The names of
the eponymous authors of the legal root-texts structure the exposition, with the
commentator’s elaborations bringing these disparate sources together.
Following Indological conventions, I have placed cited root-texts in bold, along
with words and phrases glossed from them. Sanskrit commentaries often sim
ply gloss one word with another, making an elegant English rendering difficult in
many places. Page numbers to the Srinivasacharya edition are indicated in brack
ets for ease of reference.

Preamble: The Two Categories of Documents

[125] Among the three forms of evidence,31 Vasiṣṭha32 states:

One should know that documents (lekhya) fall into two categories:
common and royal.

Common is also called “popular.” So says the maker of the Collection:33

The traditional texts state that what is written is of two types: royal
and popular.

31 Namely, documents, witnesses, and possession, first mentioned in the Vasiṣṭhadhar
masūtra 16.10: see Dharmasūtras, trans. Olivelle, 413. However, Strauch considers this
a later interpolation belonging likely to the period of the Laws of Yājñavalkya or the Laws
of Nārada, made perhaps in fourth or fifth century CE, in which documents become more
prominent: Die Lekhapaddhati-Lekhapañcāsikā, 51.

32 This name of a reputed author of a root-text of Dharmaśāstra is the first of many
mentioned in the ensuing discussion. Most are names of legendary sages of the Hindu
tradition. Apart from relative chronology and mythological associations, we know very little
about the dates of the texts or the biographies of their authors.

33 The author of the Smṛtisaṃgraha (The Collection of Traditional Texts) is simply known
as Saṃgrahakāra, the “maker of the Collection,” in the Smṛticandrikā and elsewhere. The
collection is known to us only through its citation in later digests and commentaries. See
Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, 1:537–41.

1. Royal Documents
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Of these, Vasiṣṭha states that the royal is of four types by dividing them into the
decree, and so on.
The royal is of four types: 1) the first is known as the decree (śāsana),
2) the next is the verdict (jayapatra), 3) the order (ājñā), and 4) the
instruction-document (prajñāpanapatra).

1a. Decrees
Among these, Yājñavalkya proceeds to define the decree.

When a king grants land or creates an endowment, he should have an
inscription (lekhya) made in order to inform good kings of later times.

An endowment is property that is to be acquired through an arrangement with
the king, for example: yearly or monthly, those who are engaged in commerce and
the like shall give a certain amount of wealth to this Brahmin or to this deity. Here,
even though it is the people engaged in commerce who actually give the property,
the merit nevertheless belongs to the one who makes the endowment, because the
actions of the former happen only because of the latter. The word land serves to
indicate sub-varieties such as villages, gardens, and so on. From this, Bṛhaspati:
After he donates land and such, the king should have a charitable
(dharmya) decree executed on copper-plate or on cloth34 that contains
the place, dynastic lineage, and other details.

Have executed, by the official in charge of peace treaties, war declarations, and
the like35—this completes the sense, because in this case there is a restriction on
who may be an executor of his writings. Vyāsa says the same:
34 Paṭe, “on cloth,” seems to refer to a specially prepared cloth, usually cotton, made
somewhat stiff or sized “through the application of pastes and then inscribed with a stylus”:
Sircar, Indian Epigraphy, 66–67. Unfortunately, not a single example of such a cloth bearing
a royal decree has survived to the present, though similar types of canvas are widely used
for ritual text production and sacred art: see Kapstein, “Weaving the World”; Hatley, “Paṭa.”
It may also have been the case that such canvases were used for “archival” copies of royal
decrees kept by a king’s officials or for draft copies of grants eventually inscribed on more
permanent surfaces. For further description, see Salomon, Indian Epigraphy, 132. My thanks
to several members of the Indology listserv for clarifying this term.

35 The term saṃdhivigrahādikāriṇā likely indicates the scribe of a minister of peace and
war, but it may refer to the minister himself. The two are clearly distinguished in a passage
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As instructed by the king himself, the scribe in charge of peace treaties and war declarations [126] should write out the king’s decree on
copper-plate or else on cloth, detailing the connection of the action
and the agent, including the action taken and the brief purpose.

The connection of the action and the agent, meaning a decree which includes
the connection between the action and the agent.36 Including the action taken
and the brief purpose means that the decree should incorporate the action
taken along with a brief statement of its purpose.37 Yājñavalkya states what details
should be written at the beginning of a copper-plate:
The lord of the earth should inscribe his own lineage ancestors and
himself and then a description of the grant, the extent, and the delineation of the gift.

At the beginning, he should inscribe in the customary manner a benediction com
municating the gift of boons by the glorious king, whose realm is the whole raised
earth, and who is the very body of Lord Varāha. And then, he should inscribe
the names of his three lineage ancestors—great-grandfather, grandfather, and
father, in that order—by means of a description of their virtues such as heroism
and so forth, and himself as the fourth. Then he should have written the grant, the
extent, and so on. Grant in this case means what is being granted, that is the land
or the endowment.38 Its extent means the quantity. The delineation of the gift
signifies the boundaries of the land and such that is being given.39 Vyāsa too states:
of Vyāsa below, but not elsewhere. In any case, this ministry is regularly given responsibility
for drafting royal decrees. See Scharfe, State in Indian Tradition, 151–52; and Sircar, Indian
Epigraphical Glossary, 295.

36 The gloss in this case simply clarifies that the connection should be written as part
of the decree itself and not separately, which is not perfectly clear from the root text. The
compound kriyākārakasaṃbandhaṃ must be interpreted as a bahuvrīhi, which means
literally, “in which there is a connection of action and agent,” in order to link it to the word
śāsana, “decree.” The action refers to the detailed terms of the grant or decree and the agent
specifies that it is the king himself who takes the action.
37 Grants of the sort being described often include a short statement assigning the
spiritual merit or beneficiary of the donation or indicate another purpose for making the
gift. The verse from Vyāsa below provides an example.
38 The word in question is pratigraha, which can signify both the acceptance of a gift and
the gift itself. Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa ensures that the latter meaning should be understood here.

39 The gloss in this case is sensible, but the term dānaccheda, literally “cutting the gift,” is
also regularly used to refer to imprecations against those who might violate or renege on the
gift in the future. See the texts from Bṛhaspati and Vyāsa below.
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Indicating the year, the month, the fortnight,40 the day, and the name of
the king, as well as the caste and other details, and the kin-lineage and
Vedic school of the recipient.41

The second half of this verse means that one should also write the caste (jāti), fam
ily, and Vedic school, in order to make clear the unique character of this donation.42
Similarly, other things should also be written, as Vyāsa himself states:
He should write down the locale, lineage ancestry, region, village, and
what is received, informing the Brahmins43 and all other dignitaries,
officials, [127] heads of important families, managers, envoys, physicians, and village headmen, all the way down to foreigners and outcastes: “For the merit (puṇya) of my mother and father and of myself,
I give this gift to so-and-so of this Vedic school, the son of so-and-so.”

So also, Bṛhaspati:

A gift should never be divided or taken away; it should be free from all
interference;44 it should endure for as long as the moon and sun shall
last; and it should pass down from son to grandson and to all descendants. The donor and the protector of a gift shall enjoy heaven, but the
one who rescinds it shall suffer hell for sixty thousand years—these
are the rewards of giving and violating that he should write down.

To complete the sense, he does this in order to admonish future kings and others.
Vyāsa has exactly this in mind:
40 Indian calendars, especially ritual calendars, recognize both a bright and a dark half of
the month, or lunar fortnight, following the phases of the moon.
41 The compound sagotrabrahmacārikam refers to the gotra, one of several Indic kinship
groups, and śākhā, the special branches or schools of Vedic recitation. The Smṛticandrikā
makes this identification clear below, but see also Mitākṣarā on Yājñavalkya 2.85. See the
similar requirement in section 2 below.
42 In other words, as Gharpure’s translation suggests (Smṛticandrikā, 101), the decree
should be written to allow the gift, the donor, and the recipient to be uniquely and completely
identified.
43 Read brāhmaṇāṃs tu for brāhmaṇasya. See Dharmakośa 1.375.

44 The compound sarvabhāvyavivarjitam, unexplained in the Smṛticandrikā, is taken by
one commentator to mean devabrāhmaṇanāpitādilabhyavarjitam, “exempt from the dues
normally given to gods, Brahmins, barbers, and so forth” (Dharmakośa 1.365). Another
digest offers the easier reading sarvabhāgavivarjitam, “exempt from all taxes,” especially
those levied to support the maintenance of the king’s military (Dharmakośa 1.365).
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The king should write the rewards of giving and violating that shall
last for sixty thousand years in order to admonish future kings and
governors.

Similarly, another verse, recorded only by him, should also be written.

This bridge of the Law is shared by all kings. May you protect it time
upon time, as the good Lord Rāma calls anew upon all the illustrious
lords of the earth.

Now, the king himself should write his signature (svahasta). And, thus, the same
author:
He should himself write the location and extent of the grant and his
signature.

This means he should himself write something like, “I, king so-and-so the son of
so-and-so, affirm what is written here above.” But, the scribe should also write his
own name, as the same author states: [128]
The minister of peace and war or else his scribe shall at the instruction
of the king himself write the king’s decree. At the end, he should write
his own name and seal it with the royal seal. This is the kind of royal
decree relating to villages, fields, homes, and so forth.

And, this should be entrusted to the recipient because he is the one to whom it is
useful.45 On this point, Viṣṇu:
He should give a document on cloth or copper plate and marked with
his seal in order to inform future kings.

The maker of the Collection also:

Having the mark of the king’s signature and containing his command;
bearing the royal name and sealed with the royal seal; in the local script,46

45 The phrase tasyopayogitvāt, “because he is the one to whom it is useful,” indicates that
the author anticipated situations in which a decree would need to be produced to verify the
arrangements established by the decree itself. The kind of situation the author has in mind is
noted in the next passage, namely, the failure of future kings to uphold the grant.

46 The legal validity and necessity of writing in a local script is also confirmed in section
2 below, in cases where “foreign” parties are directed to write in their own script. In fact,
royal inscriptions in India almost always employ the script used in that region. The use
of multiple scripts in epigraphy is rare (Salomon, Indian Epigraphy, 70–71), and the use
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expressed without grammatical errors, and with complete ligatures
and letters—what is granted by the king through the scribes in charge
of peace treaties and war declarations is to be known as a decree.

This means that what is given by the king to another in the stated form and writ
ten down by the scribes in charge of peace treaties and war declarations shall
be given the name decree. But, this decree is not for the purpose of making the
grant legally valid (dānasiddhyartham), because its validity occurs only through
the act of acceptance. Rather, it is for the purpose of making the grant permanent,
as the unending rewards promised depend on its permanence (sthiratva).47 For,
similarly,
For as long as his radiant fame outshines all heaven and earth shall the
doer of good dwell at the foot of the divine.48

With exactly the same intention, Yājñavalkya too states:

[129] He shall have a permanent49 decree bearing his signature and
the time executed.

Bearing the time means describing the gift or other grant specified by a particu
lar year, etc. Similarly, Vyāsa also:
The donor should write “I approve” in plain letters. It should also be
marked with the year, month, fortnight, day, and with the royal seal.
Following this procedure, he should write the document called a royal
decree.

of more than one script in documents is unstudied, to my knowledge. Cox (“Scribe and
Script,” 17–22) discusses the strategic use of the non-local Nāgarī� script in several royal
charters of the western Cālukyas in the eleventh century, though without the use of two or
more scripts in any single inscription.

47 Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa seems to intend here that only an irrevocable grant of unending
duration produces the everlasting spiritual merit desired by the donor.
48 Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa emphasizes the effect of the correlative tāvat, “to this extent,” in this
verse to connect it with the issue of a grant’s permanence. He implies that a king’s merit lasts
only as long as he continues to make gifts and protect them.
49 The word sthira, “permanent, fixed,” and its derivatives are used several times in this
section. It seems to refer, in the first place, to a longlasting material form: that a grant should
be written on a permanent or durable substance, such as copper or stone. The permanence
of a gift’s religious reward is thus said to depend on its material permanence.
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1b. Verdicts

And, similarly, the same author proceeds to define the verdict (jayapatra).

After he himself conducts legal procedures or has been briefed by the chief
judge, the king should then give a verdict for the information of others.

If one asks, to whom it should be given, he himself states:

A successful litigant is one who uses evidence to prove himself the
owner of moveable or immoveable property in the face of a doubt
raised by an accusation about a portion of it. The king should confer
upon him a definitive verdict.

Bṛhaspati, also:

When a king confers upon a successful litigant a document that ends
with the decision and incorporates the plaint, reply, and evidence, that
is called a verdict.

Incorporates the plaint, reply, and evidence is for the purpose of providing a
summary of the proceedings, because the same author also states:
What occurs in a legal procedure—the plaint and reply, as well as the
evidence and decision—all of this should be written in a verdict.

Vyāsa, also:

The plaint, the reply, the proof-stage, the adducing of evidence, the
testing of it, [130] the depositions, the traditional texts, and the determination according to the assessors (sabhya)—all of this should be
summarily written down in a verdict.

Proof-stage refers to the phase for assigning the burden of proof also known as
the determination of the burden of proof. Depositions means the testimony of
witnesses. According to the assessors means without contravening the asses
sors. Summarily, briefly. Kātyāyana, also:
The statements of the claimant and respondent, the plaint, the witnesses’ statement, and the decision that he has himself determined—
this should be successively entered letter by letter on a document.

The same author elaborates what is meant by successively.

First, the statements of the plaintiff and defendant should be entered.
Then, on the same document, he should have written the determina-

Toward a History of Documents in Medieval India

tions of the assessors, the chief judge, or, beyond these, of the families,50
as well as of the traditional legal treatises,51 and the line of thought.

The line of thought, of the king and the others—that completes the sense. The
writing of this line of thought, however, is to be done by one’s own hand, because
the author had just previously enjoined the writing of a judgment in another’s
hand in the phrase above that he has himself determined. Following this, the
same author states:
A litigant should be awarded with the amount proven in law and the
king should, with the appropriate courtesies, give him a document containing his signature. The assessors knowledgeable in the traditions
and treatises who were present for the case should likewise be required
to provide their signatures, in accordance with the rules for documents.

The meaning is: In the case of verdicts, the king should require the judges to pro
vide their signatures, as if it were a popular document.52 Vṛddhavasiṣṭha, also:
[131] When a case has been won, the winning party should be given
a verdict marked in the hand of the chief judge and other judges and
sealed with the royal seal.

Kātyāyana calls this kind of verdict by the name conclusive-document (paścātkāra):
The wise know a document created according to this procedural rule
as a conclusive-document.

But this conclusive-document is given only in a special type of judicial decision
and not in every case, as the same author states:
A conclusive-document is given in a case where one party meets the
burden of proof by means of evidence itself, but this is not prescribed
for all cases.

50 Kulānām seems to refer to cases in which the court of jurisdiction is an extended family
or kula. See Yājñavalkya 2.30.

51 These are the Dharmaśāstra texts themselves, the smṛtis. Unlike most legal writing,
the few extant verdicts or victory-documents we have do in fact cite relevant Dharmaśāstra
rules.
52 Jānapadalekhyavat, “as if it were a popular document,” is an important simile that
emphasizes the distinction to be made between most types of royal document and ordinary
documents in other contexts. Jayapatras, however, resemble the day-to-day documents
described below in their specifically judicial and evidentiary use in courts and in their use
of signatures.
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Burden of proof means what is to be proven. By saying by means of evidence
itself, he intends to say that a conclusive-document is given only in a legal proce
dure with all four phases, not in a proceeding with just two phases. And Bṛhaspati
makes this clear:
In a legal victory, one should prove the matter to be proven through all
four phases of the trial. And, a verdict including the royal seal is then
required.

In a two-phase proceeding, a verdict consisting of the plaint and reply is still given,
and it is only the label “conclusive-document” that is prohibited as it would not
reflect an accurate summary in this case. The same author describes yet another
verdict.
A verdict complete with a full account of the proceedings is to be given
to those other than the five types of losing parties, starting with the
one who changes his plea.53

Those other means the party that did not lose.54

1c. Orders

Both the order and the instruction-document have been explained by Vasiṣṭha.
A document that instructs vassal kings, retainers, or regional governors and the like about what to do is called an order.

1d. Instruction-documents
[132] A document that informs a sacrificial priest, a family priest, a
teacher, a religious dignitary, or other honorable person about what to
do is an instruction-document.

53 The Laws of Nārada (Mā 2.33) lists these five types of defeated litigants: “There are five
kinds of losers: one who changes his plea, one who shows contempt for the proceedings,
one who does not appear, one who does not reply, and one who absconds when he has been
summoned” (Nāradasmrti, 460). See also Mitākṣarā on Yājñavalkya 2.6.
54 Read ahīnavādinām for hīnavādinām. See Dharmakośa 1.366.

1e. Documents of Gratitude
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Bṛhaspati describes yet another type of royal document called the document of
gratitude.
When a king, being pleased with someone’s service, valor, and so forth,
grants in writing a locality or the like, that is a document of gratitude.

Therefore, royal documents are of five types; one should understand the earlier
statement by Vasiṣṭha that they are of four types as stated carelessly.
2. Popular documents

Now, Vyāsa defines the popular.

A scribe in a well-known location should write popular documents,
incorporating the order of the king’s lineage along with the year,
month, fortnight, and time.

Incorporating is to be read also with list beginning with the word year. Time,
day. The same author states what else should be required in a document.
He should write the name and caste of the creditor and debtor,55 as
well as the names of their fathers and ancestors, along with the extent
and the classification of the property and the interest agreed upon by
both parties.

Agreed upon by both is a specification that also modifies both of the words property and interest. Relatedly, Yājñavalkya:
In regard to any matter concluded willingly and mutually, a document
should be drawn up containing the witnesses, preceded by the creditor.

Containing the witnesses means including the names of impartial people knowl
edgeable about the matter concluded. Similarly, insofar as what is to be written
with respect to the time, creditor, debtor, witnesses, and so forth possesses legal
validity for its specific arrangement through specific details, a document should
be drawn up that provides those details. Thus, the same author says:
A document should indicate the year, month, fortnight, day, name,
caste, common kinship-lineage, common Vedic school, and one’s own
father’s name, etc.

55 From the outset, we see that the prototypical “popular” document is a contract of loan,
mortgage, or other interest-bearing financial instrument that creates a legal debt.
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[133] Common Vedic school refers to the secondary name given to a branch of
Vedic recitation such as the Bahvṛca or Kaṭha.56 One’s own father’s name indi
cates the father’s name of the creditor, debtor, and witnesses. The word etc. should
be understood to mean that the inclusion of, for example, the day of the week and
similar details should follow local standards. In this connection, Vyāsa:
In accordance with local law, the document (kriyā) should clearly note
the actions taken, what is mortgaged, and what is received.

In accordance with local law means the legal instrument (karaṇa) should follow
local law.57 What is mortgaged is the mortgaged property. Nārada, also:
A document including the witnesses should be made, in which neither the order nor the letters are broken, that follows the standards
required by local law, and that is complete with respect to all required
elements.

Vasiṣṭha, also:

One should enter the time, the king, the locale, the residence, the
names of the donor and recipient, as well as the names of their fathers,
the caste, the kinship-lineage, the Vedic branch, the property, the mortgage, including the amount, the interest, the signature of the recipient,
and two witnesses who know the transaction.

Yājñavalkya states the manner in which the recipient should enter a signature.
When a transaction has been concluded, the debtor should enter his
name in his own hand, “I, the son of so-and-so, affirm all that is written
here above.”

By saying written above, he shows that the section of letters in one’s own hand
comes below the section of letters written previously. Debtor is intended to also
indicate the witnesses. Thus, the same author:
And, an even number of witnesses should write their names preceded
by the names of their fathers in their own hand, “I, so-and-so, am a
witness to this.”

56 Branches (śākhā) of the Ṛgveda and Yajurveda, respectively. Indian inscriptions
regularly record the Vedic affiliations of the Brahmins when they receive grants and gifts.
57 The sense is that the form of the legal instrument should include details as dictated
and expected by local custom, even if those deviate from the specific lists given in the texts.
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[134] In documents requiring that the witnesses be written down, they too should
each write, “I, so-and-so, son of so-and-so, am a witness to this transaction.”
And, they should be enumerated in an even number, such as two, etc. The mean
ing is that the enumeration should not be in an odd number such as three, etc.
Some read the restriction about the number of witnesses contrarily by assuming
that the negative prefix “a-” has been elided.58 One should understand the rule
to conform to the law as observed in a particular locality, and not elsewhere, for
this might lead to doing as one pleases. The plural form witnesses refers to docu
ments that record a very important matter,59 because we have the statement of
Hārī�ta that there should be just two witnesses in an ordinary document:
A document should be made that includes the combination of each
of the following: the creditor and debtor, the two witnesses, and the
scribe—and not otherwise.

Thus, because a document written by another involves five people, namely the
creditor, debtor, two witnesses, and scribe, its common designation among people
is the “fiver” document. Where the number of witnesses required is more, how
ever, that designation is considered secondary.60 With reference to the ordinary
document, Vyāsa also states:
It should be in the debtor’s hand, including the names of the two witnesses and of their fathers.

From this, we can see that the restriction that documents should have an even
number of witnesses should be followed in a way that does not conflict with local
law. But, Nārada explains what to do when a witness or debtor is illiterate.
58 The text reads te samāḥ, “they being even (in number).” The contrary view, plausible
due to simple scribal elision in manuscripts, would read te ‘samāh (that is, te a-samāḥ), “they
being odd (in number).” Two opinions are thus recorded as to whether witnesses should be
even or odd in number. Unless an independent criterion is established, there is no way to
determine which reading is correct. Therefore, Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa insists that local customary
law should control the required number of witnesses. This allows both contradictory
readings of the rule to be possible and yet still binding in practice.
59 In Sanskrit, “plural” must mean at least three, according to the simple grammatical
existence of the dual number, but it might also mean exactly three according to the Mī�māṃsā
maxim of the kapiñjala-nyāya: see Laukikanyāyāñjali, 29–30.

60 If a locality requires more than two witnesses, then the label “fiver” (pañcārūḍha,
literally, “ascended by five”), in which only two witnesses appear, becomes “secondary”
(gauṇa), perhaps a “secondary alternative.”
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An illiterate debtor should have his attestation written for him, and
an illiterate witness should have it written by another witness in the
presence of all the witnesses.

A person who knows only a foreign script should also write for himself because he
is literate, [135] as the statement of Kātyāyana maintains:
Written scripts from all localities may be entered on a document.

Yājñavalkya explains what happens immediately after the witnesses have written
their signatures.
Finally, at the end, the scribe should write, “As requested by both parties, I, so-and-so, the son of so-and-so, have written this.

Vyāsa, also:

At the end, the scribe should write his own name in his own hand attesting, “I, so-and-so, the son of so-and-so, being asked by both parties.”
Thus, Vyāsa has laid down the rule in regard to popular documents.

At the end of the document, which completes the sense.
2a. Types of Popular Document

The same author then states that the documents thus described are of eight types.
The eight types of common document are as follows: basic (cīraka),61
self-written (svahasta), acknowledgement (upagata), mortgage (ādhi),
purchase (kraya), local convention (sthiti), reconciliation (saṃdhi),
and purification (viśuddhi).

In this context, the precise number is not the point intended, because other docu
ments such as the partition deed also fall in the common category. The maker of
the Collection now defines the basic.
Basic is the name for what is written by the elder scribes of a town,
selected by the parties involved, and praised as the best around. It

61 The precise meaning of cīraka, or ciraka, here is uncertain. It is mentioned at
Yājñavalkya 2.22 as one of two major categories of writing, with śāsana, or decree, being
the other. It may refer to a particular style of writing that was used for ordinary documents
which employed “strokes” (cīra) or produced documents that resemble rags or tattered
cloth, the usual denotation for cīra. I have opted for a neutral translation that tries to indicate
the ordinary character discernible from the context.
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should bear all the respective personal names of the two parties and
of the witnesses, preceded by the names of their fathers, and others,
as well as the signatures of the initiating party and the witnesses.
It should be clear and understandable with all the characteristics
required according to the traditional texts.

Praised, celebrated. Now, Kātyāyana defines the self-written.

[136] A document written by the recipient in his own hand, but lacking
any witness, is known as a self-written document. The wise accept it as
legal evidence.

Similarly, a document written by the donor but acknowledged by the recipient is
known as an acknowledgement. Nārada describes the mortgage deed.
When a creditor receives property as a mortgage and lends his own
money in return, the document made in this case is called a mortgage
deed.

Prajāpati states a specific rule relating to a sub-mortgage.

If a creditor contracts a higher mortgage with that same money, he
should draw up a document for the new mortgage and provide both
the new and the original to the first mortgagor. 62

Pitāmaha defines the purchase deed.

When particular property is purchased, what is executed for the sake
of publicizing the purchase as approved by the buyer and known to the
seller is known as a purchase deed.

Kātyāyana has defined the deed of local convention (sthitipatra).

A convention may belong to a group of knowers of the four Vedas, a
town, a guild, a corporate group, or a group of citizens. A document
intended to legally effect that convention should be known as a deed
of local convention. [When an accusation is leveled before an assembly
of dignitaries, the document giving a legal summary of what happened

62 Although not fully clear, the rule seems to apply to two scenarios: a mortgage to the
same mortgagor in which the terms have been renegotiated or that has been refinanced; or
a mortgage to a new mortgagor in which the terms are more advantageous to the creditor.
In either case, both the mortgage deed with the original terms and the new mortgage deed
should be given to the first mortgagor, presumably to avoid confusion or conflict around the
continuing terms of the new mortgage.
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is known as a document of reconciliation. When the reconciliation
has been reached, the document is called a reconciliation.]63 When an
accusation has been settled by persons performing a ritual penance,
the document containing the witnesses to it is known to them as the
document of purification.

Bṛhaspati also declares the division of document-types.

Common documents are of seven types: partition, gift, sale, mortgage,
local convention, slavery, debt, etc. Royal decrees are of three types.

Here, again, the precise number is not the point, because he also illustrates addi
tional documents beyond these. [137] He uses the word etc. for this very reason.
Otherwise, because by simple counting the fact that seven are enumerated, the use
of the word etc. would become pointless. By this fact, we know that the mention of
a certain number of documents is for the purpose of limitation. As a result, there
is no contradiction between rules that give variant numbers. The same author
himself explains documents of partition, and so on.
When brothers who have willingly and mutually divided their inheritance make a document of the division, it is called a document of partition. The document made when land is gifted to a worthy recipient for
as long as the moon and sun last and which is never to be divided or
seized is known as a gift deed. When one buys a house, field, or something similar, the document made furnishing in writing the original
payment price is called a purchase deed. When one gives moveable or
immoveable property as collateral for a loan, the document one makes
indicating whether the mortgage is custodial or usufructuary is called
a mortgage deed. When a village or locality makes a mutual agreement
for a purpose of the Law and it does not contravene the king, they call
that a document of convention. What is written down in a desolate
place when someone who lacks clothing or food says, “I shall perform
work for you,” is called a deed of servitude. When one receives money
on loan at interest and either makes or has made a document with the
terms for repayment, the wise call this a document of debt.

Kātyāyana describes yet another common document.

When a dispute over a boundary has been legally resolved, a boundary
deed is prescribed.

63 The bracketed verses do not appear in the printed edition of Srinivasacharya but are
found in the Dharmakośa and complete the description of different documents.

[138] Yājñavalkya, also:
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When one has paid off a debt, one should either tear up the original
document or have another made attesting to the acquittance.

2b. The Utility of Popular Documents
Marī�ci states the usefulness of documents.

When selling or mortgaging immoveable property, partitioning inheritance, and making a gift, one should both secure its legal validity and
prevent any dispute about it by means of a document.

Mortgaging, a mortgage. The first occurrence of the word and refers to the whole
range of such transactions concluded, such as debts and so on. Prevent any
dispute means that even at some later time, what happened with regard to the
concluded transaction cannot be claimed to be otherwise. Thus, having consid
ered the legal validity secured through preventing disputes about the immove
able property, and so forth, one should determine what to include and what to
remove among the various elements to be written—the royal lineage, the year, and
so on—because these serve a visible purpose.64 As a result, it is not necessary to
write the name of the creditor or debtor in a gift deed, or the like, nor even what
is received, and so forth in a document of debt, or similar contract. Moreover, even
in other types of document, what should actually be written down is a matter for
modification (ūhanīya) because the whole point of documents is to accomplish a
practical, worldly goal. Therefore, when a document, the terms of which have not
yet been fulfilled, becomes incapable of use or is destroyed, another document
must be drawn up. For this very reason, Yājñavalkya states:
When a document is located in a faraway place, has been poorly
inscribed, destroyed, effaced, stolen, ripped, burnt, or cut, another
should be created to replace it.

64 Following Indian hermeneutical principles, the Dharmaśāstra tradition draws a
distinction between properly dharmic actions that have no visible purpose (adṛṣṭārtha) and
essentially mundane acts that function to accomplish some visible purpose (dṛṣṭārtha) in
the world itself. The author here classifies almost everything discussed in this section under
the heading of “visible purpose.” The point for Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa is clearly the freedom afforded
by the possibility to rationally decide which elements should be required in a document,
since those are not subject to the unalterable obligation imposed by actions done for unseen,
transcendental purposes.
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Located in a faraway place indicates a place from which it is utterly impossi
ble to retrieve. Poorly inscribed65 refers to handwriting that is unintelligible.
Ripped, in two parts. Cut means torn apart. Kātyāyana, also:
A document that is damaged by filth, burnt, perforated, or misplaced,
or erased through perspiration should be replaced by another.

Misplaced, lost. Erased, effaced. As to what Nārada has stated:

When a document is located in a faraway place, ripped, poorly written,
or stolen, [139] then, if the document still exists, one should allow a
delay. If it no longer exists, then one should rely on the testimony of
those who have seen it.

This refers to a situation in which the debtor is prepared to repay the owed amount
right away. In this case, there is no point in making another document. Allow a
delay for the purpose of producing it: that is, fixing an allotment of time sufficient
to produce the document. The testimony of those who have seen it is what can
be made known by the witnesses to the transaction recorded in the document as
it would be available in the document itself, meaning specifically what is supposed
to be done about the repayment of the money. This, of course, should also be done,
even when a document is impossible to tear up, so that witnesses may discharge
their obligation to witness. And, a settlement deed should be received in order to
publicize the repayment. One should only create a new document when there is
money still to be repaid at a later time. For this reason, the same author states:
A new document should be made if a document is ripped, cut, stolen,
effaced, burnt, or poorly written. This is the traditional rule for documents.

Concluding Observations
The foregoing translation confirms several points of legal encounter between
scholastic writing and unwritten regional laws in medieval India.66 First, royal or

65 Durlekhya can also, and perhaps more commonly, signify a forgery. See the same in the
Nārada verses below. On forgery in Indian inscriptions, see, most recently, Salomon, “Fine
Art of Forgery.”
66 Very recently, Lubin, “Writing and the Recognition of Customary Law,” has analyzed
the function of writing in several new epigraphical sources in relation to the Sanskrit texts.
His nuanced study of varying legal purposes for written materials is a model of the kind of
history that is possible for India.
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state documents differed functionally and conceptually from ordinary documents.
Royal decrees, orders, instructions, and judicial verdicts depend on the imprima
tur of the king or an official acting in his name. The only material guarantee that
matters is his seal and signature. Such writing is a political act. By contrast, the
requirement of signatures by witnesses, assessors, and judges in verdicts signals
that signing is a legal act. Ordinary documents, too, require signatures and/or
witnesses in a way that confirms their legality. On this point, we have two modes
of practical writing distinguished through legal categories. When we find royal
inscriptions that contain lists of signatures, therefore, we are obliged to rethink
the scholastic categories and to what extent, whether, and how they may help us
understand the inscriptions.67
A second prominent emphasis in the translation is the recurrence of require
ments to consider and follow local or regional law. More than ten invocations of
local law in the discussion indicate that the specified legal requirements for docu
ments had to yield to local expectations. Even royal writings were required to use
a local script as a way to further their acceptance. In the case of popular docu
ments, local law is constantly called upon to fill in any gaps or clarify ambigui
ties in the textual laws. Signatures can and should be written in whatever script is
known to the transacting parties. Scribes should employ ordinary local language
in conveying the details of the contract. And, most importantly, the precise ele
ments required to make a document legal depend more on local standards than
on the several lists given in the texts. Here, the texts nevertheless give a reliable
impression of the kinds of details we actually find in both royal and popular docu
ments, but Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa gives the strong impression that what counted legally
were the expectations of local people, what local law required. The scholastic
legal texts acknowledge a lawmaking power outside of themselves, even as they
attempt to codify norms that undoubtedly influenced local legal expectations.
Finally, in several places, the discussion highlights aspects of the material
form of writing that were considered critical, even essential, to its legality. Simple
requirements of legibility and continuity (that is, clear, legible handwriting and
unbroken text) obviously serve to thwart forgery and fraudulent manipulation of
both royal and ordinary documents. However, the discussion also suggests that
more than textual integrity is at stake in the repeated insistence on clean, continu
ous writing. Writing is the material extension of the persons writing and transact
ing and witnessing. Its form, therefore, is bound up with their personalities and
the transaction itself. A sloppy, broken, torn, or otherwise damaged or shoddy
document portends problems, legally and morally. The text thus insists that great
67 Davis, “Law-Stuff: Content and Materiality.”
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care be taken in the preparation of documents. That care invests the writing with
the seriousness and good intention of the parties involved, thus achieving a con
gruence of form and content.
With these points in mind, our interpretation of the huge corpus of documents
from medieval India described above can begin from a contemporaneous set of
legal categories and generalizations. The contextual meaning of such documents
should start from what others at the time thought of them. Their significance does
not end there, but the interplay of scholastic legal discourse and regional docu
mentary practices demands that we consider both together.
In sum, contrary to the usual lamentations about lack of evidence (I myself
have often cried loudest), sources for a legal history of medieval India do exist in
great abundance, so great that they exceed the capacity of any individual to study
them all. What they seem not to provide, however, is the legal history that we want
to write, because there is very little familiar intrigue or entertaining conflict of the
courtroom variety in a hundred thousand land tenure documents or in a statisti
cal analysis of interest rates on mortgages or in ten thousand more endowments
of perpetual lamps for temples. What we need—what I want—is more informa
tion about dispute resolution through legal channels. But, this information we
will not find in any great measure. We are left, therefore, with the possibilities
of writing a different type of legal history. One could approach the economic his
tory of medieval India with law in mind by drawing conclusions from the aggrega
tion of documentary data about taxation, interest rates, endowment sizes, and/
or corporate and domestic production for a specific place and time.68 More in line
with my argument here, however, would be histories of law that draw upon both
documents and correlative textual and epigraphic sources, especially sources like
dharmaśāstra that are centrally concerned with law. Names, dates, and details are
necessary for any history, and this alone requires us to work from historical legal
documents first, but our understanding must be shaped by the legal encounter
with the textual tradition of dharmaśāstra which, if nothing else, represents an
Indian effort to systematize the rules and categories of law. The prestige and lon
gevity of that tradition demands our attention. An abundance of ripe fruit awaits
scholars willing explore the encounter of text and practice in the law of medieval
India; we just need more laborers in the field to pick it.

68 Excellent studies of some of these issues already exist, but none focuses on the question
of law or legal encounter. The call of this essay asks for more work that addresses the
history of law in India in a direct way. See, for example, Sinopoli, Political Economy of Craft
Production; Chattopadhyaya, Studying Early India; Heitzman, Gifts of Power.
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Abstract In order to understand the legal use and significance of documents in
medieval India, we need to start from the contemporaneous legal categories found
in the Sanskrit scholastic corpus called dharmaśāstra. By comparing these catego
ries with actual historical documents and inscriptions, we gain better insight into
the encounter of pan-Indian legal discourse in Sanskrit and regional laws in ver
nacular languages. The points of congruence and transgression in this encounter
will facilitate a nuanced history of documents and their use beyond unhelpfully
broad categories of written and oral. A new translation of one major scholastic
discussion of documents is presented as a way to raise issues relevant to any his
torical description of the legal encounter text and practice.
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